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obstacles  ill  the  pat11  of  those  is  I  Lo  1  i e  L>lisi  nesses  i n  a 
nu~nber  of  Ellropean  countries. 'l'llese  def'cns i ve  measures can  be  brought 
into force before a  T.B. is lniinched  or indeed during the  course  of 
the  .  T.B.  They  can  be a  consecluence  of  protective legislation but 
they are often the  consequence  of  differences  in  culture,  in  the 
strllct~lre  of  capital financing and  in  economic cli:nat,e. 
That is why  we  shall begin  by  clarifying the  different  forms 
of  T.B.  in  various  counLries,  before  studying  the  defensive 
strategies adopted, whether they be  of  n  financial,  a  judi-cial,  a 
statutory or of  any other kind. 
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Within the  countries  of  the  E.C.,  the  application  and 
concept  of  .  .T,B.s  vary  widely.  .T.rj.s  are  a1.most  unknown  in 
Denmark,  Greece,  Spain  and  Port:\~gal  and  these  countri  es  hove  no 
regulations concerning thea.  They are very 1.tll.e  in I t.nly ,  Gerinany ,  and 
the Netherlands,  and  fairly rare  i 11  !klg  i\~~ii. 
In  the  r\ng I  1.-  Sczxc:~  col~t~t,  rm i e  s ,  . .'I'.R.s  are  strongly 
i nfluerlced  by  f j nancin1  cons  I  tlei*i~t.  i orls  wll i  I  st.  i  11  C;c~*slnn  ic  or*  J,atin 
colln~~-ies  they are Inore  of  t.erl  ~II  icletl  t)y  arUgu~lle~\ts  of  i ndtrstr  ial  logic 
or of  increased 111arltet. stlare.  I n  PI*HII('C: and  in  Ger-many  ,  f inancia1 
~aarkets  rnilst  serve indr~stry  whereas  in  t  lie  1!.  E;. ,  the Ci.t,y  of London  is 
regarded as a  financial in(.ir~st;ry  in its ow11  I-igtrt,.  1.n  this  courrtry, 
most  of  tlle  1'.  D.  s  are fr-ienrl1.y  and  serve  the  purpose  of  welding 
together agreenlerl  ts mt~tuall  y  agreed upon  by  Got,  ti  companies .  'l'he  fear 
of a  T.  I3.  is regnrded  as an enco~tragerner~t  t;o  the management  team  to 
be  more  efficient.  'I'he  st~aret~olders  have  ttle  rj  ght  to  choose  the 
management  team,  s irlce  they  hold  the f  iirlds . 
In the other E.C.  countries, different interest groups  in the 
heart of  the business are taken into account; -  staff,  the  banks, 
the shareholders.. . ..  and  the shareholders are no  more  than  one  group 
amongst  the others. 
2.  STATIJTORY  DEFENSIVE  SI'RATEGIKS .- 
These  strategies are  based  on  measures  inscribed  in  the 
statutes of the society.  Their airn  is to avoid,  or  delay,  change  in 
the control of  management  structures.  And  so,  whoever  launches  a 
T.B.,  will not be  able to bring his policies qt~i.ckly  into  action  or 
to proceed  smoothly to dj-srupt, activities.  'I'hese  strategies  exist  in 
most  countries in which  T.I.3.s  occur, except  in  Great  Britain.  In 
that; collntry,  the managerrlerlt  of  a  b~~siness  is restricted in its mode  of 
defensive reaction.  It must  convince i t,s  s11a1-ehoI.ders,  institutional 
invest0r.s  in rrlost  cases, that  t;he  offer  is  not  sat;isfactory.  The 
arbj  trator is the Talteover  Panel.  ?'hi s  panel  suplmrts the  notion  that 
it..  is the shareholders who  must  choose who  contro1.s  the soci.ety. 
2.1.  'l'he  arrangement, of vol;ing  rig11  t,s  for-  stlur-eholl-der-s. 
'I'here  are several WAYS  of  arranging  these  :  shares  wi.  1;ho~1  t, 
voting rights or with mt11tipl.e voting  right,s  or with an upper ceiling. 
a.  Shares without voting rights exist ii-I several  countries.  ny 
issuing this kind of  shares,  the  owners  of  the  bi~siness can  keep 
control.  The loss of  voting rights i.s  coml)ensated for by  advanttrgt30us 
financial terms. 
In France, there  are  investment  certif  icat,es  and  priority 
dividend shares without voting rights,  Simi l.arL  y,  in Gerinany  and  the 
Nef-lier/a  n d*s,  there are shares without voting rights. 2 - CONTROL  OF  THE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE. 
The  main  measures  concern  the  powers  of  the  executives,  and 
restrictions on  the possibility of dismissjng then1 ...... 
A .  Spreading out executive powers  over u  period of  time. 
This technique allows only a  few  of  the  executives  to  be  replaced 
at a  t.ime,  whenever a  General  Meeting  js held.  Thjs delays the  moment 
when control. can be exercised by the raider, or sad  ;-;.st it does j.11  the 
case  of n  partial offer. 
b.  Limits on  the possibi1.it.y of cii.s~~\issing  executives. 
It  lnay  be  foreseen that an esecirt.ive  cannot be  disnlissed  w.it.hout  a  good 
t.easot1,  This is possible i  rl  France  and  espec  ia11.y  in  Gerrnarly.  In 
i;rance,  changing  a  societ-y  into a  1,inli Led  Co~nparry  with a  management 
co~~lsli.  ttee, affords better protection  for  the  esec~rtives since  then, 
they car1  only be disr~lisscd  on a  recluest  frorrl  the  supervisory council. 
C.  Opporttrni  ty to convo1;e  il  General Eleetirlg  of shareholders. 
Convoking  such a  meeting  can constitute a  valid means  of  defence by  the 
targetfed  company during a  T.B.  A  raider can use this opportunity to 
try to' change  the Management  Committee.  ?'his  happens  often  in  the 
U.S*A. 
It is possible j.n  France where  the majority shareholders can convoke  a 
general meeting,  and  also in Great  Hrit~ain,  blct  in the latter  coi~ntry, 
it is very little used. 
d  Golden parachutes. 
These  deal  with  contracts  corlcI.uded  between  a  company  and  its 
execlitives as a  restilt  of which high sums  of  money  are  paid  to  the 
executives  if there is a  change  j.n  control. of  the company  not approved 
t~y  the management  cornmi tt,ee. 
In Germany,  this method  is possi  bl e  wi  t;hi n  certain  I  j is  provi-ded 
that the sirnls  concernecf  do not,  exceed  a  cerl,ain  f igr-11-e.  In  Great 
nr*it;ain golden parachutes  r~i  11  shox-tly be  fort>iddetl. 
3. Recognition of  the sharehol.dj  ng  body. 
Static  t;es  can acknowledge  the need  Lo  pr*oiide  i n l'ormaliotr  a\. 
the cost of  the shareholders icp  to cer-Lain t,k~r-ttst~olds  of  ~)articipat.i  on. 
These  thresholds,  however,  in France,  cannot;  be  tsel ow 0,5% of  capi  t,aI . 
On  the other hand,  nomination of  the shiires or~ilt~les  t;11e  st-lnreho1der.s to 
be  better known. 